While political scientists find that democracy reduces political risk, little scholarship analyzes how authoritarian regimes attract foreign direct investment (FDI). This article argues that while authoritarian countries are generally risky, this risk can be minimized when authoritarian regimes are constrained from both "above" and "below." Signing international investment treaties are critical for authoritarian countries to signal a commitment to FDI-friendly policies. However, only authoritarian signatories that allow some degree of public deliberation in their policymaking are then constrained from deviating from the policies of the international investment treaties. Panel statistical regressions and a case analysis support the hypothesis.
When do multinational companies decide to invest in authoritarian countries? Recent scholarship overwhelmingly predicts that foreign investors will invest in countries with strong property rights in order to ensure that their assets are protected and profit losses are minimized. Yet many multinational companies (MNCs) are choosing to invest in authoritarian regimes with notoriously weak property right protections. In the past two decades, aggregate foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to authoritarian countries increased by close to 20%, and the global share of FDI inflows to authoritarian countries increased from 16% to 23% (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2009; World Bank 2011) . 1 However, within this overall increase in FDI to authoritarian regimes, variation in inflows exists-not all authoritarian countries are able to overcome their risky investment environments. Some authoritarian countries, such as Egypt and Singapore, have been successful in attracting inflows of FDI, while others, such as Myanmar and Zambia, lag behind (World Bank 2011) . For example, in the early 2000s, Jordan and Syria were authoritarian neighbors with similar levels of economic development (measured by gross domestic product per capita and life expectancy), comparable numbers of signed international investment treaties, and formal institutional constraints (elected, multiparty legislatures). Yet, despite these similarities, they attracted greatly different levels of FDI inflows. In 2008, Jordan attracted US$2.8 billion in FDI inflows, while inflows of FDI to Syria were half this amount (World Bank 2011) .
This raises the question, how do some authoritarian nations lower perceptions of risk to foreign investors? Scholars have thoroughly analyzed the role of good governance in attracting investment; yet little political science research analyzes how authoritarian regimes reduce foreign investors' expectations of profit loss and contract instability.
I argue that foreign investors prefer to invest in authoritarian regimes that are constrained from "above" and "below." The signing of an international investment treaty sends an initial signal to foreign investors of a regime's willingness to promote liberal economic policies. However, there exists a continued risk of noncompliance by the authoritarian leader. I argue that authoritarian country signatories with high levels of public deliberation in the policymaking process are credible to the policy commitments signaled by and established in bilateral investment treaties (BITs). Public deliberation involves the discussion and negotiation of policy among citizens, citizen groups, and government officials (for example, polling and conferences). Leaders in regimes with little public deliberation pursue radical, opportunistic policies, as they receive little information from the greater populace and have little accountability to citizen preferences. In contrast, in regimes with relatively high levels of public deliberation, authoritarian leaders exhibit policy stability, as they are informed on and responsive to citizen preferences. Instead of relying on coercion, these leaders maintain power and legitimacy through pursuing participatory, welfare-enhancing policies. Specially, in regards to policies on investment, authoritarian leaders relying on public deliberation processes have incentives to uphold FDI-friendly policies, as the majority of citizens in authoritarian regimes associate FDI with growth and employment-upholding the terms of the BIT is a socially optimal economic policy. Foreign investors are also aware of and value authoritarian leaders' sensitivity to societal feedback, as they participate in the deliberation process themselves. In sum, I hypothesize that bilateral investment treaties will be effective in attracting the most foreign direct investment to authoritarian countries with high levels of public deliberation, as these regimes are credible in their liberal economic policy commitments.
I use both survey and panel data to assess my claims. First, I present evidence from an original survey of US foreign investors. Survey findings provide support for the microfoundations of my hypothesis: Survey respondents are aware of and value international investment treaties and public deliberation forums and freedoms in host nations. Second, I test my hypothesis using error-correction regression analyses of global FDI inflow data. Results provide support for my hypothesis: In the long run, authoritarian countries with ratified bilateral investment treaties and high levels of public deliberation receive greater inflows of FDI than authoritarian regimes with bilateral investment treaties and low levels of public deliberation.
This research addresses a gap in the international political economy literature on the variation of FDI inflows to authoritarian countries. Current literature primarily compares democratic and authoritarian countries in their ability to attract FDI inflows without disaggregating the factors within specific regimes that contribute to this phenomenon (Jensen, Biglaiser, Li, Malesky, Pinto, Pinto, and Staats 2012) . While authoritarian countries generally have higher levels of political risk than democracies, some authoritarian countries have been able to reduce this risk and attract FDI inflows.
In essence, this article evaluates how and when international investment treaties signed by authoritarian countries are credible. Building on Chandra and Rudra (2015) , I analyze compliance from a new and nuanced perspective by focusing on how the informal institution of public deliberation, not formal institutions such as a legislature, shapes and determines policy stability. These findings directly contribute to (1) scholarship on the complementarity of international and domestic institutions in attracting foreign direct investment (Desbordes and Vicard 2009; Ginsburg 2005; Rosendorff and Shin 2011; Tobin and Rose-Ackerman 2011) ; and (2) research by Jensen, Malesky, and Weymouth (2014) and others who highlight the limits of the legislature in constraining authoritarian leaders and reducing political risk.
Finally, I present and analyze original, microlevel evidence on multinational companies' preferences for and experiences in investing in authoritarian countries. This survey addresses a gap in political science literature, as few studies use survey evidence to understand how businesses assess and mitigate political risk Staats 2010, 2012; Buthe and Milner 2009; Yackee 2010) , especially in nondemocracies.
Review of the current literature and existing gaps
Weak governance infrastructures in authoritarian countries are associated with political risk or with government interference in business operations, property, contracts, and policy (Daude and Stein 2007; Globerman and Shapiro 2002; Jensen 2003; Jensen et al. 2012; Kobrin 1979; Vadlamannati 2012) . In particular, the lack of democratic institutions is associated with a less credible rule of law and insecure property right protections (Li 2006; World Bank 2010) . Authoritarian countries therefore have higher probabilities of contract violations, expropriations or nationalizations, and other ex post policy changes by the government.
Yet evidence exists that authoritarian regimes may be able to reduce their political risk. International agreements provide a contractual framework supporting liberal economic policies, thus reducing political risk for foreign investors investing in environments with weak property right protections (Buthe and Milner 2008; Fang and Owen 2011) . The dissemination and transparency of information in international institutions facilitates the identification, monitoring, and punishment of countries that are not complying with the rules or contracts (Buthe and Milner 2008; Fang and Owen 2011; Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2002) . Further, signing an international agreement subjects the signatory nation to an international audience (Fearon 1997) . States, MNCs, and international institutions monitor the signatory nation's compliance to the international agreement to develop accurate expectations as to the signatory's commitment to liberal economic policies.
In particular, bilateral investment treaties (BITs) establish the terms for foreign direct investment (Rosendorff and Shin 2011) . BITs involve direct negotiations between countries on dispute resolution mechanisms, compensation for expropriation, and investment entrance and profitability (Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons 2006; Neumayer and Spess 2005) . BITs are intended to secure property rights through agreeing on the rights and treatment of investors as well as setting up terms for compensation and conflict resolution. Specially, Rosendorff and Shin (2011) indicate that authoritarian regimes can attract FDI with bilateral investment treaties by "importing" the BIT's stronger governance institutions (see also Ginsburg 2005) .
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Since authoritarian regimes are generally considered nontransparent (Rosendorff and Shin 2011) , BITs are especially important in these systems to signal the host country's dedication to promoting and protecting liberal economic policies (Kerner 2009; Neumayer and Spess 2005) .
3 As international agreements, BITs are highly visible and accessible contracts-texts are available on the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development's Web site, and many nations publicize BIT signings in the national media (Buthe and Milner 2009:184) .
This signal is effective, as ratifying a BIT is not a costless venture (Freeman 2013; Haftel 2010) . Violating the terms of a bilateral investment treaty is associated with financial costs if violators are taken to court (thereby involving court fees) and if financial damages are then awarded. Foreign investors indeed use the dispute resolution mechanisms established within BITs to 2 A debate exists on the effectiveness of BITs. For example, Yackee (2008) argues that BITs do not promote greater investment inflows. To my knowledge, Rosendorff and Shin (2011) are the only scholars who assess the effectiveness of BITs in authoritarian countries, and they do find a positive relationship with FDI inflows.
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The strength of this signal increases as countries enter into more treaties because of an increase in the visibility of (and information flows on) a dedication to FDI friendly policies (Allee and Peinhardt 2011 Despite these financial and reputational costs, BITs alone are not effective in attracting the most foreign direct investment inflows to authoritarian countries because of a continued risk of noncompliance.
4 Empirical research highlights, first, how authoritarian countries are not reliable in complying with international agreements (Dai 2005; Mansfield et al. 2002; Vreeland 2008) and second, that the effectiveness of bilateral investment treaties depends on the domestic institutional environment of the host government (Desbordes and Vicard 2009; Tobin and Rose-Ackerman 2011) . Without the institutional constraints found in democracies, authoritarian governments have trouble "tying their own hands" (North 1990; Olson 1993) . Regimes with weak domestic institutions cannot reduce all political risk by signing international agreements (Tobin and RoseAckerman 2011) .
Credibility in upholding international investment agreements is critical to attracting foreign investors (Alle and Peinhardt 2011), yet little research assesses when authoritarian regimes are reliable and compliant. This analysis seeks to uncover how institutional variation within authoritarian regimes affects their credibility in attracting foreign investment. Specifically, I build on Chandra and Rudra (2015) to look beyond formal power institutions within authoritarian regimes and examine the role of societal feedback in constraining an authoritarian leader's ability to make erratic, opportunistic policy decisions.
Public deliberation and credible commitments to bits
Leaders without institutional constraints are likely to pursue radical policies such as expropriations that threaten foreign investors' assets and security (Li 2009a; North and Weingast 1989; Weymouth 2011) . These leaders pursue policies in their own self-interest, as they have little accountability to (or knowledge of) public preferences. Expropriation or nationalization can benefit the leader by providing him immediate access to resources or revenue (Li 2009a) . Thus, there exists a commitment problem (Gehlbach and Keefer 2011) : Investors face great risk of an unconstrained host government violating the BIT property right policies.
Traditionally, institutional constraints associated with policy stability and credible commitments were measured through formal institutions of power or veto players (Henisz 2004; Zheng 2011 ). Yet formal political institutions in authoritarian regimes have been found to be ineffective in reducing radical policymaking; the legislature and political parties are exclusive, nonbinding, and intended for cooptation (Chandra and Rudra 2015; Lust-Okar 2005; Magaloni 2008; Wright 2008) . In regards to economic policymaking, empirical evidence suggests that formal political institutions are not effective in constraining authoritarian leaders: Jensen et al. (2014) find an insignificant relationship between the presence of a competitive legislature and expropriation risk (see also Mishler and Hildreth 1984) . 5 Instead, transparent information flows between the authoritarian leadership and citizenry is the crucial element in addressing this commitment problem (Boix and Svolik 2013) . Building on Chandra and Rudra (2015) , I argue that authoritarian regimes with higher levels of public deliberation are associated with greater policy stability or constrained leadership. Public deliberation entails dialogue, negotiation, and compromise between the government and citizens or citizen groups, and it is visible, for example, through conferences, public hearings, surveys, and civil society associational activity. Public deliberation in the policymaking process increases the information available to the government as partisans (political leaders, citizens, associations, administrators, technocrats, etc.) negotiate and compromise (Chandra and Rudra 2015) . As the authoritarian leader learns of the various policy consequences, and bargaining and compromise occurs, he will adopt "safe, incremental policy proposals" (Chandra and Rudra 2015:254) . Information exchanges through deliberation highlight "acceptable policy compromises" that avoid "large losses or gains to society" (Chandra and Rudra 2015:260) . Essentially, public deliberation provides the leader with better information on varying societal preferences and a forum through which to create a welfareenhancing, widely acceptable compromise. Although this deliberation is more advanced in democracies, some authoritarian regimes do exhibit relatively high levels of public deliberation (Chandra and Rudra 2015; Leib and He 2006; Yap 2003) .
Authoritarian leaders are sensitive to these information flows because they want to thwart rebellion and maintain power (Chandra and Rudra 2015; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006; Romero 2004) . Leaders in countries with public deliberation forums gain and maintain citizen support primarily through participatory law making and welfare-enhancing policies, as opposed to maintaining power predominantly by coercion (Linz 2000) . 6 In these public deliberation regimes, government legitimacy depends on policy inclusion and performance. Pursuing radical policies or policies that favor narrow groups at the expense of the broader population is not optimal for short-term stability or long-term survival-instead, the government must find an acceptable and safe agreement among the diverse partisans.
Further, under these conditions of deliberation, citizens are actively participating in and monitoring government policymaking. This citizen awareness of and involvement in the information exchange constrains authoritarian leaders from pursuing radical, myopic policies. In essence, citizens can "sound the alarm" when leaders deviate from welfare-enhancing policies (Mansfield et al. 2002) . In fact, organized groups have been found to be effective in punishing the leadership in authoritarian countries (Weeks 2008) .
Building on Weeks' (2008) theoretical framework for assessing when domestic actors can hold authoritarian leaders accountable, I argue that authoritarian leaders will exhibit policy stability to the terms of the BIT when public deliberation forums exist because (1) with the ability to organize for economic issues and policies, constituents will overwhelmingly communicate preferences for maintaining FDI-friendly policies as they value attracting FDI, and (2) this process of deliberation is visible and accessible to foreign investors. Attracting and sustaining FDI inflows (through FDI-friendly policies and compliance to BITs) increase the authoritarian leaders' legitimacy among the citizenry. Failure to uphold FDI-friendly policies and noncompliance to BITs would lead to public dissatisfaction and possible unrest, threatening the reputation, legitimacy, and survival of the authoritarian leadership (Fearon 1997; Mansfield et al. 2002; Weeks 2008) .
Public deliberation and citizen organizations and preferences
In authoritarian regimes with public deliberation, citizens can and do organize for economic purposes and issues. Citizen economic groups include business and labor associations and local community organizations. Organized business associations, for example, exist throughout the authoritarian world, such as in Uganda, Nigeria, Pakistan, Egypt, Jordan, Russia, China, and Morocco (Bianchi 1985; Cammett 2005; Kennedy 2009; Khadiagala 2001; Lucas 1997; Pyle 2006) . These economic groups have successfully mobilized to protect property rights, endorse liberalization, and collaborate on business ventures in authoritarian countries (Bianchi 1985; Khadiagala 2001; Lucas 1997; Pyle 2006) . Evidence from the World Bank's (2005) Business Environment and Enterprise Survey supports this notion: Respondents in authoritarian countries find business associations of major and critical value (highest values on a 1-5-point scale) to lobbying the government and accessing critical information on domestic markets and government regulations. The organization and lobbying of these groups allows for a critical exchange of information between the government and the greater community on economic policies and conditions (Schneider and Maxfield 1997; Yap 2003) . In addition to organizational activities, citizens in authoritarian countries are also actively involved in economic policy through surveys, polls, conferences, and workshops (Leib and He 2006; Ogden 2002; Romero 2004). 7 As citizens and organizations in authoritarian countries provide feedback on economic issues, a majority support property rights protections and inflows of FDI. Citizens in authoritarian regimes view FDI as welfare enhancing, as it is associated with upward mobility, economic growth, and favorable labor conditions (Hansen and Rand 2006; Linardi and Rudra 2012; Pandya 2010; TeVelde and Morrissey 2002; Tseng and Zebregs 2002) . Multinational companies provide their workers better wages, working conditions, and rights (Aitken, Harrison, and Lipsey 1996; Gorg, Strobl, and Walsh 2007; Mosley and Uno 2007; Mosley 2011) . Data from two global surveys-Pew Global Attitudes Project 2002/2007 and Asia Europe Survey (ASES) 2001-provide empirical evidence that the majority of citizens living in authoritarian countries support FDI inflows: Respondents in authoritarian countries overwhelmingly specified that foreign companies are a good influence (68%) (Pew) and that they have a lot of confidence in international big business (74%) (ASES). 8 Frye (2004) provides further evidence that under conditions of civic participation in an authoritarian regime, business associations and other social groups lobby the state to secure property right protections.
An alternative hypothesis is that groups (labor organizations or domestic firms) that oppose foreign direct investment inflows will dominate the public deliberation forums.
9 I argue that in regards to FDI policies, authoritarian leaders (who rely on participatory policymaking) have an incentive to incorporate and listen to the wider populace as they maintain legitimacy and support through welfare-enhancing policies (instead of coercion). Domestic firms (competing with foreign firms) will be active in the political discussion, yet their protectionist preferences will not dominate, as the leader has an incentive to pursue employment-enhancing policies. I also argue that labor groups will not dominate the policy debate, as, even in authoritarian regimes 7 Participatory budgeting, the phenomenon of citizens and elected officials discussing resource constraints and allocations (including investment decisions), is an example of economic policymaking involving extensive public deliberation that is practiced across the authoritarian world, such as Zimbabwe, Egypt, Tanzania, Cameroon, China, and Russia (Pateman 2012; Sintomer, Herberg, and Allegretti 2010; Shah 2007 with high levels of public deliberation, labor's organizational rights remain low. 10 For example, in authoritarian regimes with high levels of public deliberation, workers' rights remain restricted, with an average score of less than 1 (0.8) on the CIRI (2008) workers' rights scale of zero (severely restricted) to 2 (fully protected).
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Public deliberation and foreign investors
Foreign investors also recognize and value the ability to organize and provide government leaders with policy information, as MNCs themselves work and partner with local organizations that support liberal economic policies. Across the developing world, foreign investors participate in local business organizations and have foreign-based associations and institutions, such as Chambers of Commerce (Egan 2010; World Bank 2005) . While direct access to the government may be preferable, foreign investors also partner with domestic companies through joint ventures (Egan 2010; World Bank 2005) and can contact the government through these domestic channels as well. Authoritarian countries with laws permitting public deliberation provide foreign investors greater opportunity to work with local civil society and business in order to advance and ensure policies advantageous to foreign investment, as well as property right protection.
Multinational corporations also pay attention to authoritarian leaders' sensitivity to citizens for public relations purposes. Firms can identify regimes with greater levels of public deliberation through the presence of business associations and other civil society groups that work with foreign companies (as well as through monitoring state violence and repression). Firms monitor the environments where they conduct business in order to ensure their profits, publicity, and operations are sound. In fact, firms like Levi Strauss have left both Myanmar and China after egregious human right violations (Cassel 1995) .
12 Unresponsive and unconstrained authoritarian leaders are considered a risk to the long-run success of multinational businesses.
Argument summary
Ultimately, I argue that the authoritarian leaders who are most likely to comply with the terms of their ratified BITs are those who incorporate the 10 While authoritarian regimes with public deliberation forums do incorporate the wider citizenry in policymaking, not all voices and partisans are necessarily included or weighted equally in the negotiating and deliberating (Chandra and Rudra 2015) . 11 Workers' organizational capacities in authoritarian countries may be limited to prevent strikes that disrupt production and macroeconomic stability (Krueger and Mas 2004) . 12 Between 1970 and 2011, the average outward FDI from Western developed economies reached 90% of total worldwide FDI outflows (UNCTAD 2012), thus multinational concern about human rights and publicity is plausible for the majority of FDI flows.
public in their policymaking processes. These leaders have an incentive to listen to (and act on) the FDI-friendly preferences of the citizenry, as they maintain legitimacy and power through participatory policymaking. Foreign investors find authoritarian regimes that are responsive to societal feedback attractive because they exhibit stable commitments to liberal economic policies.
H1: Bilateral investment treaties ratified in authoritarian countries with high levels of public deliberation will attract the most FDI inflows, while authoritarian regimes with bilateral investment treaties and low levels of public deliberation will attract less (or no) FDI.
The microfoundation (M) underlying this hypothesis are twofold. First, foreign investors value bilateral investment treaties as a liberal economic signal (M1). Second, when provided the opportunity, foreign investors will be active participants in civil societies in host countries to further advance and secure liberal economic policies (M2).
Data, methods, and empirical results
Assessing the causal mechanisms: Original survey evidence on MNC preferences I conducted an original survey of US multinational companies' preferences for investing in authoritarian regimes. The survey analyzes how foreign investors ensure that their property and profits are secure, focusing on the role of both international treaties (BITs) and public deliberation forums (such as local organizations and institutions). Ultimately, the survey is intended to provide primary evidence on the microfoundations of my theory (M1 and M2).
The survey population is MNCs with headquarters in the United States that invest in developing countries (Sample was taken from the 2012 Uniworld Business Publications Directory following Staats 2010, 2012; Musteen, Rhyne, and Zheng 2013) . Chief executive and financial officers and upper-level managers are the targeted respondents because they have the most information and knowledge regarding investment decisions (Biglaiser and Staats 2010; Yackee 2010) . Survey respondents were randomly selected from a stratified sample based on the annual revenue, industry, and number of employees of the firms in the directory. Of the 107 returned surveys, 66 individuals indicated investing in authoritarian countries. Appendix C1 describes the distribution process, and Appendix Table C2 contains the survey questionnaire. The specific question (Q) analyzed is indicated in each following section.
In general, respondents were highly qualified, and company size was evenly represented. Among the respondents, 75% had extensive input in the decision of the company to invest abroad (Q6), and two-thirds were chief executive officers, chief financial officers (CFO), vice presidents (VP), or presidents of the company (Q2)-indicating extensive expertise in answering the survey. Additionally, the sample was fairly divided between small and large companies: On the 1 (less than 1 million) through 10 (greater than 5 billion) scale of annual revenue, the median value is a 6 (Q8). Ultimately, the survey population mirrors the broader MNC environment, thus reducing the possible reporting bias (following Biglaiser and Staats 2012) . See Appendix C3 for basic statistics on the survey respondents and a comparison of this sample with the broader MNC population of the Uniworld Business Directory.
To assess the validity of the first microfoundation of my theory (M1), I assess a survey question on the value of BITs (signed by authoritarian countries in which the respondent's company has operations) in signaling FDI-friendly policies (Q15). Half of the respondents indicated that BITs are somewhat, very, or extremely valuable in signaling a signatory's commitment to liberal economic policies (on a 1-5-point scale from not valuable to extremely valuable), while 20% of the respondents found BITs to be of little to no value, and the remaining respondents either did not answer the question or answered not applicable or don't know. Close to 60% of the CEO, CFO, VP, and presidential respondents (those classified as having top positions in the company) indicated BITs to be somewhat, very, or extremely valuable in signaling a signatory's commitment to liberal economic policies. The results of this survey question indicate that a majority of respondents find BITs to be a relatively effective signaling device of liberal economic policies.
The survey then included several questions on the respondent's company's experiences with various civil society organizations in authoritarian countries in order to further evaluate M2. Specifically, the survey asked how often MNCs worked with local organizations and the purpose of these interactions (Q16 and Q17). Figure 1 describes how often the respondent's company works with business associations, nongovernmental organizations, and chambers of commerce in authoritarian countries.
The majority of respondents indicated that their multinational company works with both business associations and civil society organizations very often (once a month or more) in authoritarian countries. Close to a quarter of the respondents indicated working with business associations and chambers of commerce once a month, while over 10% of respondents work with nongovernmental organizations once a month.
Next, the survey questioned the purpose of and possible gains associated with working with local business associations for foreign investors (Q17). Specifically, the questions asked how valuable, on a scale of 1 (not valuable) to 5 (extremely valuable), local business associations are in providing access to business networks, access to the government, information on markets, and information on regulations. Figure 2 provides the survey results. Close to half of the respondents found business associations to be (somewhat to extremely) beneficial in accessing business networks and providing market information. Close to a quarter of respondents found business associations to be very and extremely valuable in accessing the government (reaching over 40% upon including respondents who indicated somewhat valuable).
While one particular role of business associations is not especially prominent, the ultimate implication is that the respondents value various services of business associations-less than a third found business associations to be of little or no value in providing information or networking access.
To assess the overall value of local and international institutions in reducing political risk, I analyze data from the survey questions on how valuable (on a scale of 1 to 5) BITs and public deliberation forums (conceptualized as freedoms of associations and business associations) are to ensuring property right protections or profitable operations in authoritarian countries (Q13 and Q14). Around 25% of respondents indicated business associations and the freedom of association as very or extremely valuable in ensuring both secure property rights and profitable operations, and a quarter of respondents indicated BITs as very or extremely valuable for these issues. Importantly, both measures of public deliberation forums (business associations and freedom of assembly) were more highly valued than the formal political institution of the legislature in both ensuring property right protections and profitable operations. However, the results to this survey question also highlight the inability of bilateral investment treaties or public deliberation forums in isolation to be a credible commitment of property right protections for the respondents investing in authoritarian countries.
Overall, data from my original survey of US MNCs provide support for the microfoundations of the theory: For respondents investing in authoritarian countries, BITs are a valuable device in assessing the policy agenda of the government, while local organizations (particularly business associations) provide greater information on and access to government decision making.
Assessing the hypothesis: Determinants of inflows of FDI to authoritarian countries
Statistical analysis of panel data is now employed to test the hypothesis that BITs are most successful in attracting inflows of FDI in authoritarian regimes with high levels of public deliberation.
Data descriptions
FDI inflows (as a percent of gross domestic product) is the primary dependent variable (World Bank 2011), following other empirical work on the determinants of FDI inflows (Buthe and Milner 2008; Jensen 2003) . I also operationalize the dependent variable as the log of inflows of FDI in US dollars in accordance with alternative research designs (Alle and Peinhardt 2011 ; Li 2009b; Li and Resnick 2003) .
The first independent variable of interest is measured as the total number of bilateral investment treaties in force with any country (UNCTAD 2011).
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Dyadic data are not used, as they limit the sample size (these data are not widely available for developing countries) and ignore the signaling effect of BITs in attracting investment (Neumayer and Spess 2005) . Despite an overall increasing trend since the 1990s of developing countries ratifying BITs, there exists great variation in the number of BITs in force among authoritarian countries (UNCTAD 2011).
Following Chandra and Rudra (2015) , the second independent variable of interest, public deliberation, is operationalized by Marshall and Gurr's (2008) PARCOMP. PARCOMP is defined as "the degree to which political participation is free from government control" (69), and Marshall and Gurr (2008) explain that PARCOMP depends on civil interaction. PARCOMP is scaled from 1 to 5: repressive, suppressive, factional, transitional, and competitive (Marshall and Gurr 2008) .
14 Unlike formal domestic institutions in authoritarian governments, the level of public deliberation varies across authoritarian regimes. Between 1990 and 2008, regimes were almost evenly split between repressive, suppressive, and factional levels of public deliberation (measured by PARCOMP), while the overwhelming majority (78%) of these same regimes had elected legislatures. 15 Public deliberation is not an alternative measure of democracy. In fact, the level of public deliberation varies across the democratic and authoritarian developing world (Chandra and Rudra 2015) . The threshold for public deliberation affecting policy stability is low in authoritarian countries, according to Chandra and Rudra (2015) : Even modest levels of public deliberation can greatly influence national decision-making processes. Following Chandra and Rudra (2015) , I argue that authoritarian leaders in countries with high levels of public deliberation exhibit lower levels of opportunistic, radical behavior. 
Hypothesis description
My hypothesis predicts that BITs are most successful in attracting FDI inflows in authoritarian countries with high levels of public deliberation. BITs signal willingness by the government to attract and sustain FDI inflows, 14 In the developing world, the level of public deliberation is not time invariant. Average difference in PARCOMP scores in a country over 10 years is close to half a point with a standard deviation of one point. 15 Other measures of formal institutions present similar trends. Since 1990, 59% of authoritarian country-years have multiple parties in the legislature, while only 15% and 26% have no legislature or the regime party only in the legislature respectively (Cheibub et al. 2009 Li's (2009a) data provide preliminary evidence that the average number of expropriations is lower in authoritarian regimes with higher levels of public deliberation. Since 1990, 5% of BITs signed by authoritarian regimes with suppressive levels of public deliberation have been taken to ICSID, while only 3% have been taken to ICSID among autocracies with transitional levels of public deliberation (no cases exist for authoritarian regimes with competitive public deliberation levels). These preliminary data suggest higher levels of BIT compliance in authoritarian countries with public deliberation forums. 17 Other measures of democracy correlate very strongly with this classification of authoritarianism (0.82 with Marshall and Gurr [2008] 's polity).
while high levels of public deliberation constrain the leader's volatile decision making, thus ensuring stability to the FDI-friendly policies. In the sample of all authoritarian countries in 2008, countries with aboveaverage BITs and levels of public deliberation attracted the most FDI inflows (3.2% of GDP, current US$1.9 billion), while countries with below-average BITs and levels of public deliberation attracted the least FDI inflows (1.3% of GDP, current US$81 million).
18 A factorial ANOVA of this sample reveals that the interaction of a BIT's dummy variable (0 indicating below-average BITs and 1 indicating above-average BITs) and a PARCOMP dummy variable (with 0 indicating below-average levels of public deliberation and 1 indicating above-average levels of public deliberation) is statistically significant (F value of 31.32 and p value of .000) in determining FDI inflows (as a percent of GDP). Exemplary case of jordan Jordan represents an exemplary case of an authoritarian country that has been successful in attracting FDI inflows (reaching nearly 12.5% of gross domestic product or US$2.8 billion in 2008). Jordan's government not only publically declares a dedication to attracting foreign direct investment through the signing of bilateral investment treaties (and other policy initiatives), it also incorporates local citizens in the economic policymaking associated with this "attracting investment" agenda. 20 As a result, Jordan has exhibited a stable, pro-investment environment.
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Jordan has ratified bilateral investment treaties with its neighbors (Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco), the emerging developing economies (China, India, Indonesia, Russia), and the developed world (France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain, Switzerland). The breadth of the signatories highlights how the government is signaling a commitment to attracting FDI to a wide international audience and diverse group of MNCs. 22 Additionally, adherence to international law is discussed and promoted in Jordan. For example, Luck (2008) . This number can be compared to a country, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (with far fewer BITs and low levels of public deliberation), which has been taken to the ICSID eight times during this same time frame. Jordan's caseload is higher than the average of one concluded case among all authoritarian countries. Yet, of Jordan's five cases, one was dismissed in favor of the Jordanian government, three were settled, and one was rendered an award in favor of the MNC by the tribunal. 23 Despite the relatively high levels of citizen participation and freedom of association in Jordan compared to other authoritarian countries, limits on participation and associational activity do exist (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe 2009; Ryan 2010; Wiktorowicz 2000) .
Industry, Jordan Business Association, and the Jordan-U.S. Business Partnership (Carroll 2003) . 24 Linkages and communications between these economic communities and government are strong. For example, Ghazal (2012) describes cooperative seminars between the Hong Kong Trade Development Council and Amman Chamber of Commerce to promote investment. Al-Shoura and Al Bakri (2013) highlight the Jordanian Investment Board's direct engagement with foreign investors through informational meetings and investment discussions. The Jordanian Business Association (JBA) communicates often with local and foreign business communities and the government in order to promote and maintain a favorable environment for private enterprise (Knowles 2005:74-75; Carroll 2003:151) . Upon incorporating the business community's feedback through committees and community outreach, the JBA then discusses and negotiates specific policies with the Jordanian head of government outside of the formal political institutions (Carroll 2003:4, 151 ).
Jordan's government also actively involves and listens to the wider populace when devising and establishing economic policies. For example, the Jordanian government recently solicited information from the public on its privatization policies and found consensus for these market-enhancing policies. Specifically, the Jordanian Executive Privatisation Commission's national survey indicated widespread support for privatization policies, as the public associated privatization with employment opportunities, highquality services, and enhanced productivity (OECD 2008) . Additionally, national development agendas are "developed in consultation with stakeholders from different sectors, civil society associations, and the public" (Stevenson 2010:225) . For example, Marwan Muasher, the former foreign minister, led a "broad-based" committee of both governmental and societal participants in drafting the 2004-2006 National Social and Economic Development Plan (Ryan 2010:332) . This citizen involvement in policymaking occurred predominantly outside formal institutions, especially as limited representation, low voter turnout, and low levels of public confidence characterize the Jordanian parliament (Baaklini, Denoeux, and Springborg 1999) .
Ultimately, this civil society, foreign investor, and civilian participation and deliberation in the policymaking process have played a role in ensuring the continuance of investor-friendly policies in Jordan. While some of the Jordanian investor-friendly demands and policies are intended to foster a favorable investment environment for all investors (domestic and/or foreign), other policies or demands are directed specifically toward attracting foreign investment. For example, in the recent 10-year plan preparation, the Jordanian government has held "consultative meetings to listen to different views on the economy," and support for both general market enhancing and foreign investment-attracting policies was emphasized (BBC 2014). Nael Kabariti, President of the Jordan Chamber of Commerce, indicated that the meeting she attended "underlined the need to increase local and foreign investment and activate deals signed with other countries in the field" (BBC 2014). Other economic representatives at this meeting indicated promoting investor-friendly policies such as "removing red tape," "eas(ing) visa and residence permit procedures for investors," and "ensuring the stability of laws and regulations" (BBC 2014) . This is supported in the broader literature with Carroll (2003) asserting that policies advocated by the Jordanian business community are productive and market enhancing-they involved requesting greater participatory decision making, bureaucratic reform, and sectoral assistance with competitiveness. 25 The goal of this participatory, inclusionary policymaking is for the government to advance socially optimal economic policies to enhance its legitimacy. In an interview, the Jordanian Director of Securities Exchange explained that the government needs input from the private sector in order to advance policies that are employment, growth, and welfare enhancing (Carroll 2003:158) . In Jordan, "State officials repeatedly stressed the need for business to reach a consensus within the community and to then bring that consensus to the state ... then that policy is likely to ... promote the good of the economy as a whole" (Carroll 2003:164) . In essence, Jordan's government is pursuing welfare-enhancing, investor-friendly policies through its public deliberation forums.
Hypothesis testing
Building on the preliminary evidence, I now test the hypothesis with panel regressions. Statistical models include controls for economic conditions (gross domestic product [GDP] growth), risk (inflation and the rule of law), and market size (total population [log]) in accordance with Neumayer and Spess' (2005) model specification (Marshall and Gurr 2008; World Bank 2010 . I include economic stability (standard deviation of the growth rate) as an additional measure of the economic conditions and risk of the host (Chandra and Rudra 2015; World Bank 2011) . Building on Weeks (2008) , I also control for regime durability to account for the heterogeneity of audience costs and domestic accountability among authoritarian countries (Marshall and Gurr 2008) . Appendix A2 presents a correlation matrix of the independent variables. Appendix B1 and B2 contains all variable descriptions.
In order to address the nonstationarity of the independent variables of interest, I follow Beck and Katz (2011) and estimate an error correction model. 26 Ordinary least squares estimations with nonstationary data are likely to be biased and inconsistent (Jensen 2011) . Both political science and economic studies on FDI have employed this empirical technique to address unit root problems (See Basu, Chakraborty, and Reagle 2003; Jensen 2011; Trevino, Daniels, Arbelaez, and Upadhyaya 2002) . In addition, country fixed effects, a time trend variable to address the increasing trend of signing BITs, and panel-corrected standard errors are included to address autocorrelation.
27 Specifically, the model is:
The model includes both the change and lagged levels of the independent variables. The coefficient of the change in the independent variable estimates the short-run effect between that variable and FDI inflows. The coefficient of the lagged level estimates the long-run relationship. It is expected that the long-run, or permanent, relationship between BITs*public deliberation and FDI will be positive and statistically significant. BITs will be most effective in attracting FDI inflows to authoritarian countries with relatively high levels of public deliberation.
I run base and full models with BITs, public deliberation, and their interaction on both FDI inflows as a percent of GDP and FDI inflows logged. To begin, estimations exclude the interaction term to assess BITs and public deliberation on FDI inflows in isolation. I then estimate base and full models, including the interaction term. Base models exclude the rule of law to maximize observations, while the full models include the rule of law, as it is critical independent variable in estimating FDI inflows. Base models contain data from 87 authoritarian countries from 1990 through 2008. Full models contain data for 63 authoritarian countries after 2002. All models provide robust results for the independent variables of interest in the long run; see Table 2 and Figure 3 .
While BITs are effective in attracting FDI to authoritarian countries (Model 1 of Table 2 ), authoritarian countries with BITs and public deliberation attract more foreign direct investment inflows. Figure 3 highlights how, in the long run, BITs in force in countries with high levels of public deliberation are associated with greater inflows of FDI than BITs in force in regimes with low levels of public deliberation. To provide some insight into the magnitude of the effect, a 10% increase in the number of BITs a country has in force is associated with an increase in FDI inflows of 0.13 points in countries with a transitional level of public deliberation Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .1.
(PARCOMP value of 4) and a 0.16-point increase in FDI inflows in countries with a competitive environment (PARCOMP value of 5). This is significant, since within my sample of countries, FDI inflows increase by 0.11 points every year on average. Greater regime durability and less economic instability are positively associated with FDI inflows (following Busse and Hefeker 2007; Schneider and Frey 1985) . Although the negative coefficient of GDP growth is not expected by economic theory, Jensen (2003) explains this negative finding through the "scaling effect" whereby countries with economic growth rates superseding growth in FDI would experience a decline in FDI inflows as a percent of GDP (601). Growth is positive and statistically significant in the model with inflows of FDI in US dollars (log) as the dependent variable. The rule of law is not statistically significant in the aforementioned models; yet, it is positive and statistically significant in alternative models (See Appendix A7 and A8).
Robustness checks I conduct several robustness checks.
28 First, I estimate the model using alternative specifications of the dependent variable (country's percentage share of total FDI inflows to authoritarian countries), independent variables (public deliberation measured using an empowerment index operationalization (CIRI 2008) , and firm participation in business associations (Barber, Pierskalla, and Weschle 2014; Enterprise Surveys 2005) , logging the number of BITs in force, and employing total BITs signed (UNCTAD 2011), the sample (including all developing countries, excluding resource and mineral rich countries from the sample in accordance with Ross' [2012] criteria, and using Marshall and Gurr [2008] 's polity to operationalize the authoritarian countries in the sample), and estimation method (panel regression with country fixed effects). Natural resources (oil and mineral rents as a percent of GDP), human development (public education spending as a percent of GDP and life expectancy), political alliances (voting affinity to the United States in the United Nations) (Strezhnev and Voeten 2012; World Bank 2011) , trade (exports as a percent of GDP) (World Bank 2011), and economic development (GDP per capita) (World Bank 2011) are included as additional predictors of FDI inflows. In order to address the concerns that corruption and lax labor laws attract foreign investors by "greasing the wheel" and decreasing labor strikes and protests (Blanton and Blanton 2011) respectively, I also control for corruption and workers' rights (CIRI 2008; World Bank 2010) . Results are robust to these alternative specifications. 29 Results are available in Appendix A3-A7. Second, I address issues of endogeneity by running a dynamic panel model and selection model. 30 I use the Arellano-Bond method to estimate the variation of FDI in authoritarian regimes. The independent variables of interest, BITs and public deliberation, are considered endogenous in this estimation. I fail to reject no second-order autocorrelation (test statistic equal to 1.62 with a p value of .104) and the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions (chi square statistic equal to 902.75 with a p value of 0.46), thus fulfilling the Arellano-Bond assumptions of no autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic errors and a weak relationship between the instruments and error term.
31 See Appendix A8 for estimation results; the interaction of BITs and public deliberation is positive and statistically significant.
Following Rosendorff and Shin (2011) , I estimate a selection model. In the two-stage least squares regression, the dependent variable in the first stage is given a value of 1 when a country signs a BIT and has a PARCOMP score of 3 or higher (variable is given a 0 if otherwise), while the second stage's dependent variable is FDI inflows (as a percent of GDP and logged). 32 In the first stage, the number of United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) conventions is the instrumental variable for signing a bilateral investment treaty (as they indicate a country's willingness to participate in international law relationships but are not expected 29 Results are also consistent in a sample of developing-country democracies. Chandra and Rudra's (2015) theory of policy stability associated with public deliberation applies to both democracies and nondemocracies; thus this statistically significant result provides further support to this theory. Results available upon request. 30 Simmons (2010) addresses endogeneity concerns associated with international treaty research. 31 Following Roodman (2008) , results are robust upon limiting the number of instruments by setting the maximum number of lags equal to two. Results available upon request. 32 Models predicting selection into the signing of BITs and models predicting selection into high levels of public deliberation are also robust. Results available upon request.
to directly impact FDI flows to the signatory), following Rosendorff and Shin (2011; UNESCO 2013 (Henisz 2000) , the number of political parties in legislature (parties) (Cheibub et al. 2009 ), and executive constraints (xconst) (Marshall and Gurr 2008) .
33 I estimate the model including both formal political institutions and public deliberation and their respective interactions with BITs in force. See Table 3 for estimation results of the key independent variables (columns 1, 3, and 5 exclude the rule of law, and columns 2, 4, and 6 include the rule of law). Appendix A10 contains the complete table including control variables. Appendix A11 presents the results using FDI inflows (logged). Appendix A12 presents the results excluding public deliberation and the BITs*public deliberation terms. Table 3 highlights how the BITs*public deliberation interaction is consistently positive and statistically significant, even when controlling for formal political institutions. In these models, formal institutions are (inconsistently) associated with a decline in FDI inflows to authoritarian countries with BITs in force (Table 3 and Appendix A10 and A11). 34 Upon excluding public deliberation from the model, formal institutions do not attract FDI inflowsregression results reveal that increased formal constraints (executive constraints, veto players, and parties in the legislature) are insignificant in predicting FDI (Appendix A12). Overall, my results reveal that foreign investors do not value formal institutions as a means to secure their property in authoritarian regimes.
Conclusion
Despite their weak rule of law, some authoritarian developing countries continue to attract foreign direct investment inflows. This article explains Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .1.
the conditions under which authoritarian regimes can and do reduce their political risk and attract foreign investment. I argue that international investment treaties are necessary to initially attract foreign investors to authoritarian regimes because they signal a dedication to FDI-friendly policies. However, an authoritarian regime's openness to citizen input plays a key role in ensuring policy stability to these liberal economic policies. Under conditions of public deliberation, citizens can voice their preferences for FDI-friendly policies, while leaders in these regimes have an incentive to listen to these citizens' preferences, as they maintain power through participatory policymaking. Thus, international investment treaties will be most effective in attracting foreign investors in authoritarian countries with high levels of public deliberation-leaders in these regimes are most credible in upholding FDI-friendly policies in the long term. Statistical regressions of panel data provide empirical support for this hypothesis. These results are robust to alternative specifications of the dependent variable, independent variables of interest, sample, and estimation strategy. Further, an original survey of US multinational companies investing in authoritarian countries presents primary evidence on the mechanisms underlying my argument. Survey respondents view BITs as a signal of liberal economic policies and actively participate in host country civil society activities to continue to advance and promote FDI-friendly policy.
This investigation assesses Chandra and Rudra's (2015) public deliberation theory in the particular issue area of foreign direct investment. I underscore public deliberation's role in enhancing compliance and stability to international investment treaties. Additionally, I contribute to current scholarship by providing critical insight on citizen attitudes and organizational activities on foreign investment, the deliberative channels and penchants of foreign investors, and political risk determinants in authoritarian countries. Future assessments of host country political risk or investment attractiveness would do well to incorporate dimensions of public deliberation in their analyses, as authoritarian countries that offer channels for citizen dialogue and feedback are more reliable in upholding established economic policies.
University of Pittsburgh's Graduate School for Public and International Affairs, and four anonymous reviewers for their feedback.
Funding
The University of Pittsburgh's International Business Center and Fordham University's Faculty Research Grant provided funding for the survey research.
